30 April 2022: Recently, pilots reported navigation disturbances near the Russian-Finnish border.
There is a strong suspicion that these are deliberate Russian GPS jamming attacks. Researchers at the University of the Bundeswehr are working on methods to detect and geolocate such interference sources from space with the highest possible sensitivity.
According to Finnish authorities, the GPS disruptions occurred immediately after the meeting between the Presidents of Finland and the United States.
As part of the SeRANIS small satellite mission at the University of the Bundeswehr Munich, Nikolas Dütsch investigates such interference attacks and explains the possible background of these incidents:
“GPS interference attacks can, simply put, be divided into two categories: jamming and spoofing. In jamming, a strong interference signal is transmitted in a region, blocking GPS reception so that receivers can no longer calculate their position. This is comparable to two people who can no longer talk to each other because of excessive noise”, Dütsch explains. In this analogy, the two people represent the satellites transmitting navigation signals and the navigation device in an aircraft or on the ground receiving and processing those signals.
In contrast, spoofing undermines the integrity of positional information by transmitting manipulated GPS navigation signals, causing the receiver to calculate an incorrect position. This tricks the user into believing they are somewhere else. For example, simple GPS-controlled drones can be prevented from entering certain areas in this way.
Interference devices can be purchased by anyone
The topic is more relevant than ever. “We are seeing a rise in such interference attacks on navigation systems based on media reports”, says Dütsch. This is partly because devices for jamming or spoofing can be purchased online for just a few euros for private use. Nevertheless, intentionally transmitting signals in the reserved frequency bands for radio navigation services is prohibited.
“In the age of partially and soon fully autonomous driving, the availability and reliability of positional information at all times is essential”, Dütsch adds. However, from his perspective as a researcher, there is little cause for concern: most applications rely on a variety of additional sensors that operate completely independently and can maintain navigation capability even during short-term GPS outages — for instance, using inertial navigation sensors.
Faulty devices can unintentionally cause interference
Within the SeRANIS small satellite mission, Dütsch is researching methods to detect such interference sources from space, geolocate them with high precision, and characterize their signal structure. These sources are by no means always intentional. Faulty devices, for example, can unintentionally emit signals that interfere with GPS and other services. “With the mission, we are laying the foundation for global recording of jamming and spoofing incidents and providing valuable insights into attack vectors that can be used, among other things, to increase system robustness”, Dütsch explains.
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